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Abstract 
We review several observations in the bank loan loss provisioning literature to identify and discuss 
several advances in the literature and to suggest possible directions for future research in the 
literature. We address several issues including the ethical dimensions of income smoothing, 
motivations and constrains to income smoothing, methodological issues in the bank loan loss 
provisions literature and the dynamic loan loss provisioning experiment. We identify some challenges 
in the literature and proffer directions for future research.  
JEL Code: G21; G28.  
Keywords: banks, dynamic provisioning, loan loss provisions, income smoothing, procyclicality, 
capital management, signalling, accounting discretion, Islamic banking. 
 
1. Introduction 
Banks are financial institutions that primarily collect deposit and issue loan to individuals, firms and 
governments to finance consumption, investment and capital expenditure, thereby contributing to 
economic growth. Bank lending to borrowers gives rise to credit risk where borrowers are unable 
repay the principal and/or interest on loan due to unfavourable economic conditions and related 
factors. To mitigate credit risk, in principle, banks will set aside a specific amount as a cushion to 
absorb expected loss on banks’ loan portfolio and this amount is referred to as loan loss provisions 
(LLPs) or provisions for bad debts; therefore, loan loss provisions estimate is a credit risk 
management tool used by banks to mitigate expected losses on bank loan portfolio. To date, there are 
growing concerns that bank LLPs are not solely driven by credit risk considerations but rather are 
influenced by other opportunistic financial reporting objectives. In this paper, we review the loan loss 
provisioning literature that address these concerns and we attempt to proffer some solutions to ensure 
that bank loan loss provisions reflect its underlying economic reality. 
The banking sector is vital to national and global economies and banks play a key role as depository 
institutions and lender to firms, individuals and governments (Lobo, 2016). Given the importance of 
banks, loan loss provision estimates play a key role for bank stability and soundness while fulfilling 
their lending functions to society. In financial regulation, loan loss provisions continue to receive 
much attention from bank supervisors for the following reasons. One, banks’ large amount of loan on 
their balance sheet makes them vulnerable to loan defaults arising from deteriorating economic 
conditions which affects borrowers’ ability to repay, requiring banks to keep sufficient loan loss 
provisions in anticipation of expected losses (Laeven and Majnoni, 2003). Two, bank provisioning is 
often procyclical and tend to worsen an existing recession if unanticipated, and this was evident at the 
peak of the 2008 global financial crisis as many US and European banks significantly increased their 
loan loss provisions estimates which further eroded bank earnings and led to losses that depleted bank 
capital, requiring Central Bank intervention through bailouts. Three, loan loss provisions estimate is a 
significant bank accrual and bank managers continue to retain significant discretion in the 
determination of loan loss provisions estimates and such discretion can be exploited to meet 
opportunistic financial reporting objectives rather than for credit risk purposes (Whalen, 1994). Four, 
bank loan loss provisions estimate is a crucial micro-prudential surveillance tool that bank supervisors 
use to assess the quality of banks’ loan portfolio apart from non-performing loans ratio, and LLP is 
also a crucial indicator of the informativeness of bank accruals from an accounting standard-setting 
perspective. Five, bank loan loss provisions have become the most debated accounting number in 
bank financial reporting after bank profitability and derivatives since the 2008 global financial crisis.  
We commend Wall and Koch (2000)’s early review that present a broad overview on bank loan loss 
provisions for over a decade now. In contrast, we identify the need to bring together in one article the 
recent developments in loan loss provisions research that has progressed beyond Wall and Koch 
(2000) in order to provide a comprehensive understanding of the role of bank loan loss provisions for 
accounting information quality and macro-financial stability. We explore several strand of literature in 
LLP research to identify recent advances in the literature, highlight some challenges in LLP research 
and suggest possible directions for future research with some concluding remarks. 
Our analysis in the paper contribute to the literature in the following way. One, our review contribute 
to the prudential regulation banking literature by demonstrating that bank provisions is linked to 
capital regulation and countercyclical policy designs aimed at ensuring banking soundness and 
solvency during stressed periods. Two, by relating LLPs to income smoothing, our study make a 
contribution to the broad earnings management literature by demonstrating that loan loss provisions 
estimates can be manipulated by bank managers to influence the level of reported earnings. Finally, 
we deliberately did not elaborated on some issues, the most important ones being the following two. 
First, we did not elaborate extensively on bank loan loss provisioning among Islamic banks because 
the distinction between Islamic and conventional banks is often unclear and the provisioning rules for 
both Islamic and convention banks are the same. Second, we did not elaborate extensively on dynamic 
provisioning because research on dynamic provisioning to date appears to be biased towards a single 
country analysis - Spain. Likewise, we did not elaborate on the relationship between discretionary 
provisions and stock returns because changes in stock prices may be driven strongly by other 
unobservable factors rather than discretionary loan loss provisions. Additionally, our remarks on the 
challenges in the LLP literature are not intended to be comprehensive but instead are limited to issues 
in the literature that we find to be particularly significant. Finally, while we note that the value of a 
research review is measured by its success in inspiring researchers to produce new ideas to this line of 
research, our aim in this review is to elicit comments and stimulate debates that can potentially 
advance LLP research in the broader banking literature. 
The remainder of the study is organised as follows. Section 2 discuss several advances in the LLP 
literature and the ethical dimensions of income smoothing. Section 3 address the methodological 
advances and issues in literature. Section 4 present some challenges in LLP research. Section 5 
suggest some directions for future research. Section 6 provides some comments and concluding 
remarks. 
 
2. Loan Loss Provisions Research: Advances 
2.1. Importance of LLP research 
LLP research remain a fruitful area of banking research for four main reasons. One, LLP is the most 
significant discretionary accrual at the disposal of bank managers; two, because LLP has a direct 
impact on bank interest margin and overall earnings; three, because LLP is linked to bank regulators’ 
micro-prudential surveillance and is linked to the informativeness of accounting disclosures in 
financial reports required by accounting standard-setters and; four, because of the availability of bank-
year data on LLP estimates. 
While LLP research can be complicated by: (i) the process that determine LLP estimates, that is, the 
assumptions, methodology and other unobservable managerial choices taken into consideration; and 
(ii) the cross-country differences in the accounting for loan loss provisions across countries; the LLP 
literature continue to exploit these variation in LLP practices to deepen our understanding of various 
manifestations of managerial discretion in provisioning among banks across countries and regions. 
2.2. Research Areas and Future Direction 
Broadly, there are four strand of literature in LLP research. The first strand of literature relate to 
studies that test the capital management hypothesis commonly referred to as the LLP-capital 
management literature that examine whether banks increase LLPs when they have insufficient equity 
capital in order to compensate for their low equity capital levels (Kilic et al, 2012; Bonin and Kosak, 
2013) or whether banks influence the size of LLP estimates to meet minimum regulatory capital 
requirements (Moyer, 1990; Ahmed et al., 1999). Notably, the work of Ahmed et al. (1999) is core to 
this strand of literature. Ahmed et al. (1999) examine 113 US banks during the 1986 to1995 period 
and find that banks use LLPs to manage minimum regulatory capital levels. Nonetheless, evidence to 
support the capital management hypothesis is rather inconclusive in the literature (Collins et al, 1995; 
Leventis et al, 2011; Curcio and Hasan, 2015). Moreover, and with respect to equity capital, it is not 
clear whether the change in LLPs (in response to change in equity capital) is driven by incremental 
changes in ‘specific’ or ‘general’ provisions. In other words, while banks can overstate (understate) 
LLPs when they are undercapitalised (overcapitalised), it is not clear whether the incremental increase 
(decrease) in LLPs is targeted at specific provisions or general provisions or both. Future research is 
needed to shed more light on whether abnormal changes in loan loss provisions in response to 
changes in bank equity level is significantly associated specific or general provisions. 
The second strand of literature relate to studies that test the signalling hypothesis commonly referred 
to as the LLP-signalling literature that examine whether banks use abnormal changes in LLPs to 
signal information about firms’ future prospects, implying that bank managers possibly report 
abnormal LLP estimates in anticipation of high future earnings or in anticipation of high non-
performing loans (Liu and Ryan, 1995; Liu et al, 1997; Kanagaretnam et al., 2005). To extend the 
signalling debate, bank practitioners can also report abnormal loan loss provisions to mitigate 
potential losses arising from the loss of customer loyalty and business deals following the departure of 
a CEO whose influence is tied to greater customer loyalty and larger business deals for the bank. 
Future research investigating the LLP-signalling hypothesis should provide insights on whether 
abnormal loan loss provisions are used by bank managers to signal the consequence of the removal of 
a bad CEO or the sudden exit of a good CEO. The future researcher can empirically examine the 
association between abnormal LLP in the quarter(s) before the announcement of CEO exit compared 
to abnormal LLP in the immediate quarter after CEO exit. 
The third strand of literature is the cyclicality literature that investigate the behaviour of bank LLPs 
during changing macroeconomic conditions. The literature argue that bank provisioning behaviour is 
procyclical with business cycle developments and reinforce the current state of the economy (Bikker 
and Hu, 2002; Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005; Beatty and Liao, 2009). By procyclical, they mean that 
when banks enter recessionary periods the rational response of bank managers is to decrease lending 
and increase LLPs. Increased bank provisioning during recessionary periods will further reduce bank 
net interest margin and decrease bank overall profit and worsen the state of banks during the 
recession. If the recession is sustained, bank capital may be completely wiped out which further 
worsen the state of banks and financial system. 
The fourth strand of literature investigate the possibility of adopting a dynamic provisioning system. 
Policy makers advocate the need for a counter-cyclical or dynamic provisioning system. A dynamic 
loan loss provisioning system is a loan loss provisioning system where banks report higher LLPs 
during good times and report fewer LLPs during economic downturns so that the surplus LLPs 
accumulated during good economic times is used to mitigate bank losses during economic downturns 
(Saurina, 2009). Spain adopted the dynamic provisioning system in the year 2000 and has remained 
the laboratory for policy (and academic) researchers to test the effectiveness of dynamic provisioning 
as a solution to eliminate LLPs’ procyclical behaviour since its adoption (Fillat and Montoriol-
Garriga, 2010; Jiménez et al., 2012). One weakness is that studies that focus on Spanish banks have 
been criticised for producing results that are biased towards Spanish banks only. Another major 
weakness of any dynamic provisioning system is that it is only workable if the transition from an 
economic recession into an economic boom and vice versa, is easy for policy makers to detect; in 
practice, such transition is difficult to detect because ‘business cycle developments are hard to 
foresee, given their erratic duration and amplitude’ (Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005: 144). Another 
weakness is that the ability of a dynamic provisioning system to generate sufficient loan loss 
provision buffers in anticipation of stressed periods will depend on the severity of a crisis and the time 
lag of the existing crisis (Fillat and Montoriol-Garriga, 2010), therefore, a dynamic provisioning 
system may not be sustainable if it is stress-tested against prolonged recessionary periods because 
loan loss reserves (provisions) would be exhausted if the recession is prolonged. 
The fifth strand of literature relate to studies that test the income smoothing hypothesis commonly 
referred to as the LLP-income smoothing literature that examine whether banks overstate (or 
understate) LLPs when earnings are high (or low) in order to report smooth earnings so that reported 
earnings never seem to be too high or too low (Laeven and Majnoni, 2003; Kanagaretnam et al., 2004; 
Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005; Liu and Ryan, 2006; Anandarajan et al., 2007; Fonseca and 
Gonzalez, 2008; Leventis et al., 2011; El Sood, 2012; Curcio and Hasan, 2015; Ozili, 2015; Skala, 
2015; Ozili, 2017). The literature documents mixed conclusions to support the income smoothing 
hypothesis (Ahmed et al, 1999; Collins et al, 1995), nonetheless, the LLP-income smoothing literature 
remain the most extensively debated topic in LLP research, thus, Section 2.3 focuses on the LLP-
income smoothing debate in the literature. 
Another emerging theme in the LLP literature is the conflict between prudential regulatory objectives 
and accounting standard setting objectives (Gaston and Song, 2014). After the 2008 financial crisis, 
bank regulators require banks to take pro-active or forward-looking measures towards provisioning 
which includes keeping sufficient LLPs even when expected credit risk is apparently low, so that 
banks can have enough loan loss reserves/provisions to act as buffers to absorb loan losses that 
materialise during bad times (FSF, 2009; Adrian and Shin, 2010; Balla et al, 2012). The practice of 
keeping provisions estimate at an amount above the level that is commensurate with banks’ expected 
credit risk is considered to be consistent with the bank safety and stability objective of bank 
supervisors from a prudential regulation perspective but is highly criticised by accounting standard 
setters because such practice constitute manipulation of accounting numbers (i.e. LLP) which reduces 
the reliability of bank loan loss provisions estimates reported in financial reports and can mislead 
bank stakeholder and analysts. International accounting standards (IFRS and FASB) oppose the 
provisioning for loan losses that are unlikely to occur and only approve of bank provisioning for loan 
losses that are highly probable if the amount of the loss can be reasonably estimated. The rationale is 
to prevent banks from using loan loss provisions (or reserves) as a tool to manipulate/manage reported 
earnings - a common practice where bank managers could shift income from good quarters to bad 
quarters by taking large loan loss provisions when earnings are high and small provisions when 
income are low (Balla et al, 2012), and accounting standard-setters maintain that this kind of 
manipulation of provisions (and reserves) reduces the reliability and informativeness of loan loss 
provision estimates and the transparency of bank financial report. 
Finally, another strand of LLP research focus on country-specific studies and regional studies. Such 
studies examine the loan loss provisioning practices of banks in several contexts such as US [(El 
Sood, 2012; Balbao et al, 2013; Kilic et al, 2012; Balla and Rose, 2015)], European [(Leventis et al., 
2011; Bouvatier et al., 2014; Curcio and Hasan, 2015; Skala, 2015; Ozili, 2017)], cross-country 
[(Cavallo and Majnoni, 2002; Fonseca and Gonzalez, 2008; Bushman and William, 2012; Kar, 
2015)], Australian and Asian context [(Anandarajan et al, 2007; Packer and Zhu, 2012; Wu et al, 
2015; Curcio et al, 2014; Bryce et al, 2015; Acar and Ipci, 2015; Abdul Adzis et al, 2016)]. The loan 
loss provisioning practices of banks in certain regional contexts remain unexplored in the literature 
such as the Sub-Saharan African (SSA) region and the Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) region. 
Future research can shed some insight about whether unique regional differences influence the 
provisioning behaviour of banks across several regions. 
2.3. Factors influencing bank income smoothing 
The LLP-income smoothing literature is the most debated issue in the LLP literature, therefore, this 
section focus on income smoothing via LLP. Bank income smoothing is the process by which banks 
make reported earnings appear stable (or smooth) over time so that reported earnings never seem to be 
too high or too low. While it is impossible to provide an exhaustive list of all factors that influence 
bank income smoothing behaviour, we identify some notable factors in the literature that influence 
this behaviour. 
2.3.1. Motivation to Smooth Income: Evidence 
One, capital markets create incentives for banks to smooth their reported earnings. There is the 
argument that if smoothed earnings reduces earnings variability then lower earnings variability would 
translate to lower stock price fluctuations which reduces the volatility of stock return and investors 
prefer lower stock return volatility. Anandarajan et al (2007) and Leventis et al (2011) find evidence 
to support this claim. Two, the need to avoid excessive scrutiny of firm profit by regulators and 
political commentators also create incentive for firms to smooth their profit particularly for larger 
firms that report excessive profits (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997). Similarly, banks can smooth 
reported earnings to avoid excessive scrutiny of banks’ profit by bank regulators/supervisors. Three, 
regulatory arbitrage can create incentives to smooth income as banks can take advantage of existing 
weaknesses or loophole in regulation as an opportunity to smooth reported earnings, given their 
opportunity. For instance, Kilic et al. (2012) investigate whether the strict recognition and 
classification requirements of SFAS 133 that reduced US banks' ability to use derivatives to smooth 
earnings encouraged the affected US banks to rely more on LLPs to smooth reported earnings rather 
than relying on derivatives. They find evidence that US banks use LLPs to smooth earnings when 
accounting disclosure regulation made it difficult to use derivatives to smooth bank earnings. Four, 
the trade-off between rule-based vs principles-based accounting standards can also create incentives 
for banks to smooth income. Ashraf et al (2014) investigate whether changes in accounting standards 
and prudential regulatory regimes influence the use of LLPs to smooth earnings among 7343 banks 
from 118 countries during the 1999 to 2010 period. They find that banks under a rule-based 
accounting regime exhibit higher levels of earnings smoothing compared to banks under a principles-
based accounting regime. Five, corruption can increase the extent of bank income smoothing because 
corruption in banks manifest through non-transparent reporting, and increased earnings smoothing 
decreases the transparency of bank financial reporting (Bhattacharya et al, 2003; Riahi-Belkaoui, 
2003). Six, competition also influence firms (including banks) to smooth income because earnings 
management in competitive environments may help firms prosper in the short-run but at the same 
time can reduce firms’ ability to compete in the long-run (Marciukaityte and Park, 2009). Francis et al 
(2004) observe that earnings smoothing help firms to reduce the cost of capital by reducing 
information asymmetry between managers and investors and increase the firms’ ability to compete 
while Marciukaityte and Park (2009) find that firms report higher earnings smoothing ratios and 
conclude that firms in competitive environments are more likely to engage in earnings smoothing 
practices. Seven, transient economic events can create additional incentives for banks to smooth 
income. Liu and Ryan (2006) find that US banks use LLPs to smooth income during the 1990 
economic boom. El Sood (2012) finds that US banks accelerate LLPs to smooth earnings when they 
are more profitable and during non-recessionary periods while Balbao et al (2013) find that US banks 
use LLPs to smooth earnings when earnings are more profitable. Eight, national culture can encourage 
income smoothing behaviour among banks because banks in societies that encourage high risk-taking, 
implicitly as a culture, may record relatively lower LLPs in good times and higher LLPs in bad times 
which allow banks to smooth income. Kanagaretnam et al (2011) in a cross-country study examine 
the relationship between four dimensions of national culture and earnings quality during the pre-
financial crisis period and find that banks in high individualism, high power distance and low 
uncertainty-avoidance societies report smoother earnings. They also observe that cultures that 
encourage higher risk-taking experience more bank troubles in the form of larger losses or larger 
provisions during the global financial crisis. 
2.3.2. Constraint to Smooth Income: Evidence 
One, strict accounting disclosure regulation can reduce bank managers’ opportunity to manipulate 
LLP estimates to smooth reported earnings. Leventis et al. (2011) investigate bank income smoothing 
during mandatory IFRS adoption among some listed EU banks and find that the use of LLPs to 
smooth earnings is reduced after IFRS adoption. Balla and Rose (2015) examine whether accounting 
constraints introduced by the US SEC in 1998 limit LLP-based income smoothing among US banks 
and find that shortly after the SEC enforced the accounting constraint the relationship between LLPs 
and earnings weakened for publicly-held banks but not for privately-held banks. Abdul Adzis et al. 
(2016) investigate the impact of IAS 39 among banks in Hong Kong and find that bank income 
smoothing via LLP is reduced after adoption and compliance with IAS 39. Two, strong religiosity can 
discourage the use of LLP estimates to manipulate reported earnings. Kanagaretnam et al. (2015) 
investigate the impact of religiosity on bank earning quality and find that religiosity is negatively 
related to earnings smoothing. Taktak et al. (2010) did not find evidence for bank income smoothing 
via LLPs for Islamic banks. Farook et al (2014) observe that Islamic banks consistently record lower 
loan loss provisions relative to conventional banks. Three, higher audit quality can constrain the 
extent of income smoothing because the presence of Big-4 auditor in firms is often considered to 
reflect superior audit quality and their presence should discourage opportunistic earnings 
manipulation (DeAngelo, 1981). Consistently, Kanagaretnam et al. (2010) find less aggressive income 
smoothing behaviour among banks that have a Big-4 auditor. Four, strong investor protection should 
discourage bank income smoothing. Foncesa and Gonzalez (2008) in a cross country study find that 
bank earnings smoothing behaviour decreases with stronger investor protection while Shen and Chih 
(2005) find that strong protection of minority shareholders rights discourage bank earnings 
management behaviour but legal enforcement quality had no impact on bank earnings management. 
Five, certain bank ownership structure can provide additional monitoring to discourage bank income 
smoothing. Fan and Wong (2002) investigate the relationship between earnings informativeness and 
ownership structure for 977 companies in seven East Asian economies and find that concentrated 
ownership is associated with low earnings informativeness. Leuz et al. (2003) find that industrial 
firms with dispersed ownership structure engage in less earnings management. Gebhardt and 
Novotny-Farkas (2011) investigate the implication of mandatory IFRS adoption for the accounting 
quality of EU banks and find that income smoothing is pronounced among listed European banks that 
are widely held (disperse ownership). Bouvatier et al. (2014) examine the impact of ownership 
concentration on the earnings smoothing practices of EU banks and find that income smoothing is 
reduced among banks with disperse ownership. Six, strict banking supervision can reduce the extent 
of bank income smoothing. Cavallo and Majnoni (2002) and Bouvatier et al. (2014) show that bank 
income smoothing is reduced among banks in countries with strong banking supervision. 
2.3.3. Is Income Smoothing Ethical? 
Finally, in this section we address the issue of ethics and income smoothing. The question above seem 
easy but is difficult to answer and whatever answer we postulate depends on what we mean by 
‘ethical’ while noting that the meaning of the term ‘ethics’ depend on the context and circumstance of 
the social agent(s) facing an ethical dilemma. Income smoothing behaviour itself does not constitute 
an outright violation of bank regulatory/supervisory rules and does not constitute an outright violation 
of accounting standards whether rule-based or principles-based because income smoothing practices 
arise from exercising managerial discretion in financial reporting and in meeting prudential regulatory 
requirements and both regulatory frameworks permit managerial discretion in bank financial 
reporting. This, therefore, leave academics, policy researchers, regulators and accounting standard-
setters with the question: is it ethical for firms or banks to smooth reported earnings? Whether income 
smoothing is ethical or unethical should depend on the motive for doing so. Income smoothing by 
bank managers may be considered ethical if they do so to: save for a rainy day (Greenawalt and 
Sinkey, 1988), to protect their jobs (DeFond and Park, 1997, Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995), to reduce 
information asymmetry between owners and managers (Tucker and Zarowin, 2006), to improve bank 
stability by smoothing out abnormal fluctuations in reported earnings (Wall and Koch, 2000), and to 
improve the risk perception of banks to bank bondholders and regulators/supervisors (El Sood, 2012). 
On the other hand, bank income smoothing may be considered to be unethical if they do so to: 
opportunistically receive bonuses (Healy, 1985), reduce the informativeness of reported earnings 
(Leventis et al, 2011), increase the opacity of bank financial reporting (Bhattacharya et al, 2003), to 
lower the quality of reported earnings (Ahmed et al, 2013), and to avoid shareholder interference or to 
avoid tax and improve terms of trade and pursue a fixed dividend pay-out ratio (Vander Bauwhede, 
1998). 
 
3. Methodological: Advances and Issues 
In the literature (Wahlen, 1994; Ahmed et al, 1999; Laeven and Majnoni, 2003), the baseline model to 
investigate the determinants of bank provisioning is expressed as:  
Discretionary Provisions = f (non-discretionary provisions, relevant bank-specific factors, institutional 
factors, country and/or regional factors) 
Depending on the objective of the researcher, the empirical researcher would specify the regression 
model to obtain the functional form of the relationship he or she is investigating. For this reason, it is 
difficult to criticise the LLP regression model employed by a researcher without understanding the 
research objective and the underlying assumptions taken into consideration by the researcher. In 
addition to specifying a good LLP model, the researcher will make specific econometric adjustments 
to the LLP model involving either pooled/panel adjustments, static/dynamic panel adjustments, 
system/difference GMM model adjustments and other variations including fixed or random effects 
(see. Laeven and Majnoni, 2003; Cavallo and Majnoni, 2002; Packer and Zhu, 2012; Floro, 2010; 
Leventis et al, 2011; El Sood, 2012; Bouvatier et al, 2014; Curcio and Hasan, 2015). Some studies 
combine regression models with other methods in their analyses while only few studies employ a non-
regression methodology while examining bank LLPs (see. Balasubramanyan et al., 2013).  
One major progress in LLP modelling has been the reduction in construct validity problems. Unlike 
the construct validity issues commonly associated with using accruals to measure earnings quality 
among industrial firms in the earnings quality literature (DeFond, 2010)1, the measures (or proxies) 
used to capture discretionary LLPs and its non-discretionary determinants in many LLP models have 
low construct validity problems because there have been strong commitment among banking 
researchers to ensure that each LLP constructs and the explanatory variables measure what it intends 
to measure. 
Also, the empirical literature have identified several factors that explain changes in the level of bank 
provisions in an attempt to reduce the size of the error term, and such variables include commission 
and fee income which reflects bank income diversity, that is, banks’ willingness to engage in non-
depository activities; and when this is the case, banks will keep more LLPs to remain safe while it 
offer multiple services that are not related to its core deposit-taking activities (Anandarajan et al, 
2007; Leventis et al, 2011).  
Also, the pooling together of large banks with small banks raise serious concern that the LLP estimate 
and total asset value for large and small banks might be skewed due to substantial bank size 
differences. One way to address this issue is to normalise the LLP and total asset variables by taking 
the natural logarithm of LLP and total asset.  
One major research design issue in the empirical literature is the choice of a deflator for the LLP 
variable and the earnings explanatory variable. Commonly used deflators are: total assets (Cavallo 
and Majnoni, 2002; El Sood, 2012; Bouvatier et al, 2014; Curcio and Hasan, 2015, Ozili, 2015), 
beginning total assets (Kanagaretnam et al, 2010; Kilic et al, 2012), beginning total loans (Bushman 
and William, 2012), gross or average loan (Anandarajan et al, 2007; Leventis et al, 2011). For 
instance, the use of average loan as a deflator for the earnings variable takes into account the business 
model of the bank while beginning total asset deflator takes into account banks’ actual size without 
reference to future investments in bank assets while the total asset deflator takes into account future 
investments in bank assets. To date, the literature show no consensus on the choice of deflator. 
Overall, while a common trend in social science research involves creating proxies for phenomena 
                                                          
1 Dechow et al (2010) presents an extensive literature review on earnings quality. 
 
that cannot be directly observed, there appear to be a high degree of confidence that the proxies used 
in LLP research (published in peer-reviewed journal) actually measure the underlying theoretical 
constructs they are intended to measure. 
 
4. Challenges in LLP Research 
4.1. Comparability of LLP estimates - A Critique 
LLP research can be complicated by the process, assumptions, methods and other unobservable 
factors that bank managers take into consideration to determine loan loss provision estimates. This 
means that LLP estimate is a function of the accounting system that generates the estimate, the 
assumptions made and the decisions of the bank manager and other considerations that remain 
unknown or unobservable to the empirical researcher. Because researchers are not privy to full 
information regarding the determination of LLP estimates, the comparability of LLP estimates from 
one bank to another bank can be difficult and even more difficult when comparing LLP estimates 
among banks across countries, making it difficult to compare the findings of several empirical studies. 
4.2. Two Conflicting LLP Estimates. 
International accounting standards (IFRS) propose the incurred loss provisioning model while the 
Basel Committee for Banking Supervision (BCBS) propose the expected credit loss provisioning 
model.2 The expected credit loss model generates higher LLP estimates while the incurred loss model 
generates a lower LLP estimates. These two models yield two different LLP estimates and therefore 
pose a challenge for LLP research. For instance, if banks are not required to strictly adopt one of the 
two models, bank managers can choose to adopt the expected credit loss provisioning model when 
                                                          
2 There are two provisioning models: the incurred loss model and the expected credit loss model introduced by 
accounting standard setters and Basel regulation, respectively. Basel II regulation employs the ‘expected credit 
loss provisioning’ model which emphasize the recognition of credit risk based on the borrower’s economic and 
financial conditions even if the loss has not been incurred (see. Gaston and Song, 2014; BCBS, 2015). The 
objective of this model is to build sufficient provisions, in addition to bank capital, to cover the risk bank takes. 
The incurred loss provisioning model, on the other hand, require banks to increase loan loss reserves 
(provisions) only when it becomes highly probable that a loss is imminent, and if the amount of that loss can be 
reasonably estimated. 
they want to reduce high profit because expected credit loss model generates high LLPs, alternatively, 
bank managers can choose to adopt the incurred loss provisioning model in order to increase low 
earnings since the incurred loss model generates lower LLP estimate. While there is no definitive 
solution to reconcile the conflict between these two LLPs estimates (Bushman and Landsman, 2010; 
Balla et al, 2012), one possible attempt to reconcile this conflict would be to persuade accounting 
standard-setters to replace the incurred loss model with a forward-looking provisioning model that is 
in line with the expected credit loss provisioning model (Gaston and Song, 2014). Nevertheless, any 
attempt to reconcile these conflicts should take into account (i) the role of the complex interaction 
between the accounting, macroeconomic and prudential framework of a country; (ii) the fact that the 
level of loan loss provisions (in the income statement) and the adequacy of loan loss reserve (in the 
balance sheet) is only as good as the methodology employed to estimate losses in the loan portfolio 
(Angklomkliew et al, 2009), and that forward-looking provisioning gives bank managers a licence to 
engage in speculative provisioning practices (Bushman and William, 2012). 
4.3. Paucity of Critical Studies 
A fourth concern is the paucity of critical studies in the LLP literature. By critical studies, we do mean 
critical research that invalidates prior findings, rather, we mean studies that challenge the proxies used 
and assumptions underlying current LLP models in order to increase the commitment of researchers 
to ensure that existing and new proxies continue to measure what they are intended to measure, 
therefore, the need for such critical studies is paramount. The lack of critical studies in LLP research 
can be attributed to the fact that policy makers, financial economists and academic researchers are 
more interested in LLP research that is result-driven, that is, the need to see results. As long as 
academic researchers interested in LLP research continue to take a positivist (quantitative) approach 
to LLP research, it could take a long time for a considerable number of critical LLP studies to emerge. 
Also, the fewer the number of academics interested in LLP research, the more difficult it is for critical 
studies to emerge. 
4.4. Qualitative Studies 
The final concern is that LLP research is dominated by quantitative methods while there are little or 
no qualitative studies on LLP research. A look at the first forty peer-reviewed LLP articles chosen at 
random in Google scholar search from 2012 to 2016 confirm that LLP studies that use qualitative or 
non-regression models are unpopular among empirical LLP studies at least for now. There is at least 
one study that use qualitative research methods (see. Balasubramanyan et al, 2013). One reason for 
this in our view is that LLP research appears to be of little of interest to the qualitative or non-
empirical researcher. We need to find a way to attract non-empirical researchers to LLP research 
because there are interesting research questions that regression models cannot provide answer to. 
Also, we need qualitative studies to verify/check whether the findings of qualitative LLP research are 
consistent with the theory underlying the findings of most empirical LLP studies. 
 
5. Additional Future Direction 
One, continuous revision to Basel capital accord continue to provide opportunities for future LLP 
research. Basel II and III have implemented some changes to bank capital regulation which also 
require a change in the way banks use loan loss provisions. These changes will take years for its full 
effect to be felt. While prior studies investigate the impact of Basel I on bank provisioning decisions, 
studies that examine the impact of Basel II and III on discretionary bank provisioning are yet to 
emerge. Future studies could investigate the impact of Basel III regulation on banks’ provisioning 
discretion to shed some insight on how changes in capital regulation rules affects banks’ provisioning 
discretion in financial reporting. 
Two, the literature do not provide insight on the provisioning practices of banks that are classified as 
‘systemic important financial institutions’ (SIFIs) compared to bank that are classified as ‘non-
systemic important financial institutions’ (non-SIFIs). This classification of banks and other financial 
institutions as ‘systemic’ is recent and there is little knowledge in the literature about the financial 
reporting characteristics of systemic firms. Therefore, it is interesting to investigate whether systemic 
important financial institutions use loan loss provisions differently than non-systemic important 
financial institutions and whether systemic important financial institutions collectively use provisions 
to report competitive earnings and to manage capital levels. 
Three, with regard to income smoothing, capital management and the signalling hypotheses, prior 
studies pay little attention to whether there are overlapping motivations to distort LLP estimates and 
the factors that lead to the choice of one motivation over the other. By overlapping motivations, we 
mean that bank managers may feel the pressure to signal information to investors and to smooth 
income at the same time but they can only achieve one at a time not both. Future research can provide 
insights to improve our understanding of banks’ decision regarding the use of LLPs when they face 
conflicting motivations. 
Four, in dynamic loan loss provisioning, there is the argument that increased scrutiny and supervision 
should guide the implementation of dynamic provisioning process (Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005). 
Future research is needed to demonstrate how monitoring and supervisory models would guide 
regulators in a dynamic loan loss provisioning system while bearing in mind that the willingness of 
bank regulators/supervisors to supervise bank provisioning decisions may also depend on (i) whether 
regulators believe they should supervise banks’ accounting practices; (ii) the extent to which 
regulators believe auditors should perform the supervisory role; (iii) whether an independent 
supervisory body should be created to perform this role even if doing this further complicates the 
already complex accounting, fiscal and prudential bank regulatory network. Future research could 
clarify how supervision will guide the dynamic provisioning process and not interfere with the 
accounting and audit role. 
 
6. Comments and Concluding Remark 
Counter-cyclical or dynamic loan loss provisioning is a policy experiment and just like every 
experiment caution must be taken. Bank supervisors in many countries are reluctant to enforce a 
dynamic loan loss provisioning system for banks because it is a policy experiment and, of course, 
experiments can go wrong. However, many countries may finally adopt this system of provisioning in 
the near future as more country-specific success stories emerge, for example, in Spain. The usual 
caveat apply that the best solution is not always implemented if the perceived cost outweighs its 
benefits. If the perceived cost of implementing and monitoring a dynamic loan loss provisioning 
system is greater than its intended benefit, then dynamic provisioning may not be implemented in 
some countries at least for now even if it solves the problem of LLP procyclicality. While the on-
going debate seem to converge towards the need for national bank supervisors to adopt a dynamic 
loan loss provisioning system, the process of determining the exact time to trigger dynamic provisions 
during business cycle developments remain an inexact science and cannot be predicted by a static 
model. 
Another issue worth noting is that accounting standard-setters face political pressure to replace the 
incurred loss provisioning model with the expected credit loss provisioning model. From legitimacy 
theory, we know that accounting is socially constructed and exists within a context (Guthrie and 
Parker; 1989; Deegan, 2006). Because the IASB and IASC’s provisioning models are permitted to 
guide the provisioning practices of banks in the banking sector, to retain its legitimacy, accounting 
standard setters will bow to the pressure of bank regulators in order to maintain their legitimacy 
within the banking industry. Accordingly, the expect credit loss provisioning model in IFRS 9 (to be 
implemented in 2018) will eventually replace the incurred-loss model.3 The new IFRS 9 provisioning 
model does not specify a particular measurement methodology to estimate LLPs but permit significant 
managerial discretion in determining what LLP estimates should be. Such discretion is permitted to 
allow banks meet the needs of bank regulators/supervisors although it remain critical that banks can 
exploit such discretion to smooth or manipulate reported earnings.  
Conclusions drawn from this review is that LLP research have made a significant transition from 
country-specific and regional studies towards studies that examine how LLP interacts with the larger 
                                                          
3 The new IFRS provisioning model known as the ‘expected credit loss model’ will replace the incurred loss 
model in 2018. The model require that credit loss recognition should be forward-looking rather than when an 
actual loss event occurs. Under this model, “credit losses are measured at different stages, marked by 12-month 
and life-time expected credit loss recognitions. In the so called first stage, 12-months’ expected credit losses are 
recognized. When assets experience significant increase of credit risk, they enter the second stage and life-time 
expected losses are to be assessed and measured.” (Gaston and Song, 2014: p.11). , 
macroeconomic, accounting, cultural, prudential and institutional factors in an economy. Also, several 
provisioning models have been designed to ensure that bank provisions are adequate and such models 
are only as good as the assumptions underlying the model and the inputs included in the model. 
Regardless of the novelty of any provisioning system imposed on banks by regulators, there is still the 
need to actively limit bank managers’ discretion in determining the level of loan loss provisions 
estimates. If bank managers continue to retain significant control on what inputs to include in, or 
exclude from, their LLP models, then such models may not yield the intended level of provisioning 
bank supervisors expect. If standard setters, bank supervisors and policy makers do not pay attention 
to specific accounting judgements made by bank managers in relation to LLPs, the issue of 
opportunistic income smoothing behaviour is likely to remain. From a standard setting perspective, 
there should be a limit to managerial discretion because it is illogical for standard-setters to have 
evidence that bank managers manipulate LLPs to smooth income, to receive bonus4, to manage 
regulatory capital and to signal future prospects, and then blame a methodology for such practice 
without putting the blame on managers who make provisioning decisions themselves. 
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